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Abstract The aim of the (recast) Dublin III Regulation is to enhance the effective-
ness of the Dublin system while securing higher standards of protection for appli-
cants. The Regulation provides for new tools to achieve these aims. In practice, the
implementation of the new Regulation has proven to be challenging, but is generally
working well. However, there are still areas for improvement. Especially the right to
family life and the right to an effective remedy, need to be further strengthened to
conform to human rights standards.
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1 Introduction
Following the evaluation of the Dublin system in 20071 the Commission tabled a
proposal for a recast of the so-called Dublin II Regulation2 in 2008.3 The initial
proposal immediately faced strong opposition from the Member States for various
1Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the evaluation of the Dublin
system, COM(2007) 299 final, 6 June 2007.
2Council Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 of 18 February 2003 establishing the criteria and mechanisms
for determining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application lodged in one of the
Member States by a third-country national, OJ, L 50 of 25 February 2003, 1 (“Dublin II Regulation”).
3COM(2008) 820 final, 3 December 2008.
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Regulation” which took place on 28–29 April 2014 in Trier.
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reasons. After several rounds of consultations the new substantially revised Regula-
tion (EU) No. 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council4 entered into
force in July 2013.5 Following the logical numbering it is now commonly referred to
as “Dublin III Regulation.” The main aim of the recast was to enhance effectiveness
in the application of the Dublin system and to ensure higher standards of protection
for persons subjected to the Dublin procedure.6
Many of the inconsistencies and potential areas for improvement in the appli-
cation of the Dublin II Regulation had been also highlighted by scholars7 and in
non-governmental reports looking at the application of the Dublin II Regulation.8
Similarly, the case law of national courts as well as the European Court of Human
Rights (ECtHR) indicated a need to review the Dublin II Regulation. The necessary
adjustments were so significant that a recast was deemed necessary.9 Moreover, the
existing case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (‘CJEU’) has helped
to clarify some of the most fundamental legal issues and has significantly influenced
the recast process.
The case law covered a number of important themes starting with the time limits
for transfers in the case of appeals.10 Prior to the recast the CJEU had also issued
judgments on the principle of non-refoulement and on the use of the sovereignty
clause,11 on the application of the Dublin system in the case of withdrawal of the asy-
lum application,12 on the application of the Reception Conditions Directive13 during
Dublin procedures,14 on the application of the “dependency clause” of Article 15 (2)
of the Dublin-II-Regulation,15 on the obligation to investigate in cases of envisaged
transfers,16 and on the application of Article 6 (2) of the Dublin-II-Regulation (con-
cerning unaccompanied minors with no family members (or relatives) in the Dublin
area) and the best interests of the child.17 These judgments have informed and influ-
4Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 establishing
the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application
for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless
person (recast), OJ, L 180 of 29 June 2013, 31 (“Dublin III Regulation”).
5See the documents of the recast process as available under Eur-Lex, in particular the first proposal by the
Commission of 2008 (see above note 3).
6See e.g. recital 9 of the Dublin III Regulation.
7See e.g. Maiani/Vevstad [2].
8See e.g. UNHCR and ECRE [3].
9See recital 1 of the Dublin III Regulation.
10CJEU, Case C-19/08, Petrosian, 29 January 2009, ECLI:EU:C:2009:41.
11CJEU, Case C-411/10 and C-493/10, N.S. and Others, 21 December 2011, ECLI:EU:C:2011:865. The
outcome of this judgment was reconfirmed by the CJEU after the recast process had ended in the judge-
ment, Case C-4/11, Puid, 14 November 2013, ECLI:EU:C:2013:740.
12CJEU, Case C-620/10, Kastrati, 3 May 2012, ECLI:EU:C:2012:265.
13Council Directive 2003/9/EC of 27 January 2003 laying down minimum standards for the reception of
asylum seekers, OJ L 31 of 6 February 2003, 18.
14CJEU, Case C-179/11, CIMADE and GISTI, 27 September 2012, ECLI:EU:C:2012:594.
15CJEU, Case C-245/11, K , 6 November 2012, ECLI:EU:C:2012:685.
16CJEU, Case C-528/11, Halaf, 30 May 2013, ECLI:EU:C:2013:342.
17CJEU, Case C-648/11, MA and Others, 6 June 2013, ECLI:EU:C:2013:367.
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enced the recast process. Since the end of the recast process, the CJEU has given two
rulings: one on the (non-)obligation of Member States to use the sovereignty clause18
and one on individual rights and appeals in the context of the criterion of illegal entry
(Article 10 (1) of the Dublin-II-Regulation).19
The purpose of the recast was to further develop and improve the Dublin system.
Consequently, the underlying principles of the Dublin system were re-confirmed in
the light of the evaluation and practical experience with the system. The main aims of
the recast were to improve “the effectiveness of the Dublin system and the protection
granted to applicants under that system.”20 One key factor of the prolonged negotia-
tions was article 31 of the Commission Proposal of 2008 providing for a possibility
to suspend transfers to Member States under certain circumstances. This idea faced
strong opposition from some Member States. As a compromise Article 3321 provides
for “a mechanism for early warning, preparedness and crisis management.” The ex-
act shape and functioning of the mechanism as well as its potential is still unclear. At
the time of writing, EASO had started steps to find a way to implement this mecha-
nism. The power and effectiveness of this mechanism will very much depend on its
practical application within the CEAS and by EASO.
On a practical note the aim to enhance effectiveness is reflected by the introduc-
tion of Regulation No. 118/201422 amending the 2003 Dublin Implementing Regu-
lation.23
Another aspect in this context is the content of the recast EURODAC Regulation.
It is further noteworthy that Denmark does not take part in the application of the recast
Regulation according to recital 42, although in practice Denmark is fully participating
in the system.24
This article will analyze the “reformed” Dublin system as established by the recast
under the two main themes of enhanced effectiveness and higher standards of protec-
tion. In the concluding remarks it will highlight some areas for improvement and
clarification, and will propose some ways for a human-rights sensitive way forward
for the application of the Dublin III Regulation.
18See above note 11.
19CJEU, Case C-394/12, Abdullahi, 10 December 2013, ECLI:EU:C:2013:813.
20Recital 9 of the Dublin III Regulation.
21All articles with no specification are articles of the Dublin III Regulation.
22Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 118/2014 of 30 January 2014 amending Regulation
(EC) No 1560/2003 laying down detailed rules for the application of Council Regulation (EC) No
343/2003 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for ex-
amining an asylum application lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national, OJ L 39 of
8 February 2014, 4.
23Commission Regulation (EC) No 1560/2003 of 2 September 2003 laying down detailed rules for the
application of Council Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for deter-
mining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application lodged in one of the Member
States by a third-country national, OJ L 222 of 5 September 2003, 3.
24As the Dublin II Regulation was repealed (see article 48) there is no legal basis in place for the applica-
tion of the Dublin rules in procedures with Denmark.
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2 Enhancing effectiveness
2.1 International protection
As the Dublin II Regulation was the first legal act of the CEAS that entered into
force its compatibility with the rest of the EU asylum acquis was not fully guaran-
teed. Therefore, one major objective of the recast was to align the Dublin system with
the system of the CEAS by incorporating the concept of “international protection”—
comprising refugee protection and subsidiary protection—into the Dublin III Regula-
tion. The scope of application for Dublin procedures has been considerably widened
by this principal change.25 Consequently, the Dublin system now applies to all appli-
cants for international protection and not only to persons asking for refugee protec-
tion. Also the family criteria have been changed accordingly. According to Article 9
of the Dublin III Regulation a person, who has been granted international protection,
may be joined by a family member, if the family member has applied for international
protection in the Dublin area. A similar (but practically less significant) change has
been made in Article 10 of the Dublin III Regulation for persons whose application is
still being determined at first instance. Looking at the aim to create a real CEAS these
changes are logical and have been inevitable from an EU law perspective. In practice,
these changes may pose certain challenges. One of them is the fact that the asso-
ciated states Switzerland and Liechtenstein do not apply the concept of subsidiary
protection in their national law and the respective complementary form of protection
(“provisional admission”) is—in both countries—associated with a “non-status” that
does not guarantee the same rights as provided to beneficiaries of subsidiary protec-
tion under the Qualification Directive.
From a practitioner’s point of view the incorporation of the concept of interna-
tional protection means that it has become more difficult to “circumvent” the Dublin
system by not applying for refugee protection. After the recast it would be neces-
sary to refrain from lodging an application for international protection and to rely
instead on national humanitarian protection and/or non-refoulement provisions if a
client does not want to return to the potentially responsible state. Looking at the con-
sequences this may also mean that persons are still able to avoid transfers under the
Dublin system, but that they are facing as a consequence a potentially precarious
status in the country where they are staying.26 From a purely legal perspective, this
might not be seen as a problem as the persons are “circumventing” the system. Look-
ing at it from the perspective of the asylum seeker/lawyer the consequences are far
more severe as it may affect the ability to integrate into society and build a livelihood
for potential refugees.
2.2 Criteria
Regarding the criteria, the main principles for the determination of responsibility
remain the same. If the asylum seeker is not an unaccompanied minor (Article 8) or
25See Recital 10.
26This is only possible if a system of protection on the national level allows for such an application. For
the case of Germany, this effect has been described by Bender/Bethke, [1], 358.
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does not have family members in another Dublin State, (Articles 9–11) the state that
has facilitated the entry of the third-country national or stateless person to the territory
of the Member States is responsible for examining the asylum application. The same
logical sequence as set out in the Dublin-II-Regulation of residence permits, visa,
non-denial of illegal entry, visa waived entry and asylum application in a transit zone
of an international airport has been retained (Articles 12–15). For reasons of clarity
the “first application reason” (Article 13 of the Dublin II Regulation) has been moved
to Article 3 (2) 1.
Article 3 (2) and (3) contains the reflection of N.S. and Others:27 If a transfer
cannot be carried out due to “systemic flaws in the asylum procedure and in the re-
ception conditions for applicants in that Member State, resulting in a risk of inhuman
or degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 4 of the Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union,” the assessment of the criteria continues. This means
that the Member State that carries out the Dublin procedure restarts the assessment
with the next criterion.28 If no responsible Member State can be established through
the criteria and no asylum application was lodged in a Member State to which the
person could be transferred, the Member State carrying out the Dublin assessment
is responsible for the substantive examination of the asylum application. This new
set of rules in conjunction with Article 18 (2)29 aims at guaranteeing that every asy-
lum seeker has access to a substantive examination of his/her claim in the EU.30 The
new level of details within the family criteria is also remarkable and will be further
examined in conjunction with the dependency and discretionary clause under 3.1.2
below.
2.3 Requests and time limits
Time limits within the Dublin III Regulation have been significantly amended as the
framework now also provides for time limits for take back requests (Articles 23 and
24) and not only as in the previous Regulation for take charge requests. In practice,
this will lead to a maximum length of a Dublin procedure of 11 months (if no appeal
is lodged) and will therefore facilitate the efficient use of the Dublin system from
this point of view. The regular time limits are three months for take charge requests
and for take back requests; if the request is based on Eurodac data the time limit
for making the request shall be “within two months of receiving of the Eurodac hit”
(Articles 21, 23 and 24). This seems to be complicated as there are now two starting
27See above note 11.
28E.g. if Greece was determined to be responsible according to the illegal entry clause (article 13 (1)) and
a transfer to Greece cannot be carried out. The Member State needs to examine the criteria starting with
the illegal stay clause (article 13 (2)).
29Article 18 (2) foresees that the responsible Member State shall “examine or complete the examination of
the application for international protection made by the applicant” also in cases where the applicant has left
the territory prior to the finalization of the examination. This provision has the effect that a discontinuation
for formal reasons of an examination (e.g. because of “implicit withdrawal” or “renunciation” by the
applicant) is no longer compatible with the rules of the CEAS.
30The only exception foreseen is the (practically so far quasi irrelevant) safe third country clause of article
3 (3).
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points for the time limits: if Eurodac data is available the reception of the data by
the Member State is determinative, whereas in cases without such data the starting
point is the asylum application. If a Member State does not request the taking over
of the asylum procedure within the time limits, it will be responsible for examining
the asylum application (if no asylum application was lodged in the requesting state,
the state of stay shall give the person a possibility to lodge an asylum application if
he/she is staying without residence documents in that Member State (Article 24 (3)).
The already existing time limits for replying to such requests have been slightly
modified and to some extent clarified. The Regulation further clarifies that there are
no time limits for humanitarian requests before a first instance decision on the sub-
stance is taken. The reason for this is that the respective circumstances may arise
after the time limits have passed. In case a humanitarian request is lodged to another
Member State the reply by this Member State shall be given within two months (Ar-
ticle 17 (2)). The responsibility does not shift to the requested state if no answer is
provided.
If a state lodges a Dublin request to another state via DublinNet it is required to
send the respective means of proof and/or circumstantial evidence with the request.31
Any negative answer shall state the reasons for the refusal. If one Member State
refuses a take back or take charge request, it shall give reasons for the refusal. The
requesting state may ask the other State for information (Article 34 of the Dublin III
Regulation and Annex V of the Regulation 118/2014), but there are no time limits for
this procedure so that consensus needs to be reached between the two States that are
involved. This need for consensus (with no formal “appeals” procedure) and the fact
that most of the States insist on formal means of proof for accepting responsibility
has been already highlighted by the Commission in the evaluation report.32 The new
provisions do not effectively address these issues and the reformed Dublin III system
still needs to establish “rules of procedure” regarding the newly introduced elements.
2.4 Transfers and information sharing
Section VI (on transfers) consisting of Articles 29–32 brings together the provisions
on transfers and clarifies some of the key questions that had arisen in the application
of the Dublin II Regulation. Article 29 contains the ground rules on the modalities and
time limits for transfers. Whereas the time limits for transfers remain unchanged,33
some of the modalities have been changed and/or more clearly defined. The principle
that the transfer should be carried out in a “humane manner and with full respect for
fundamental rights and human dignity” has been inserted into the Regulation for su-
pervised departures or transfers under escort (Article 29 (1) 2). The costs of transfers
31See articles 21 (3), 23 (4) and 24 (5) refer to the respective lists in article 22 (3).
32See evaluation report (note 1), 8.
33According to Article 29 (1) and (2) the transfer needs to be carried out within a time limit of six months
of the acceptance of the request. In accordance with the CJEU decision in the case Petrosian the time limits
starts to run from the final decision on an appeal or review where there is suspensive effect in accordance
with article 27 (3). within six months from the final decisions. The time limit may be extended if the person
is in criminal detention (up to maximum of one year) or if the person absconds (up to a maximum period
of 18 months). If the transfer is not carried out within this time limit responsibility is transferred to the
requesting state.
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are regulated in article 30 and are normally on the transferring state. This rule also
applies to erroneous transfers or transfers that have been carried out if the transfer de-
cision is subsequently overturned on appeal or review. Article 30 (3) explicitly states
that transferees shall not be required to meet the transfer costs.
Articles 31 and 32 provide for the exchange of relevant information and health
data before a transfer is carried out. This exchange is facilitated and regulated in
more depth by the new set of rules and the forms provided for the exchange of data.
There are separate forms for the information exchange for “normal” cases, in depen-
dency cases, in cases concerning unaccompanied and for the exchange of health data
(Annexes VI–IX of Regulation 118/2014).
2.5 Eurodac
The recast Eurodac Regulation that will enter into force on 21 July 2015 contains
(from a Dublin point of view) only a small number changes. The principles and the
situations in which a comparison of Eurodac data for the purpose of the allocation
of responsibility is carried out remain the same. The recast mainly envisaged that
Eurodac data may also be used under clearly defined circumstances by law enforce-
ment authorities and Europol for law enforcement purpose and that the Regulation
would be compatible with the Regulation (EU) No 1077/2011 establishing a Euro-
pean Agency for the operational management of large-scale IT systems in the area
of freedom, security and justice. Consequently, the rules for the collection, transmis-
sion and comparison of data for Dublin purposes remained basically the same, but
the changes had effects on the numbering of the respective articles. Under the pre-
conditions that the respective person is over 14 years of age, data in Eurodac is still
stored in two situations: (1) if a person lodges an asylum application data is entered
and stored for 10 years (article 9–12 of the recast Eurodac Regulation), (2) if a third-
country national or a stateless person is apprehended in connection with the irregular
crossing of an external border. This latter data may be stored in the database for
18 months (Articles 14–16 of the recast Eurodac Regulation). Data of third-country
nationals or stateless persons “found illegally staying” in the territory of a Member
State is still not stored in Eurodac, but may be used on a one time basis for the pur-
pose of comparison in (potential) Dublin procedures (article 17 of the recast Eurodac
Regulation).
Moreover, the recast Regulation addresses some practical challenges of diverging
nature such as specification of time limits and data to be collected (articles 9 and
14 of the recast Eurodac regulation) and the rules for data use if a person is granted
international protection, a residence permit or citizenship (articles 13, 16 and 18 of
the recast Eurodac Regulation). Moreover, the rules for data protection have been
fully revised and contain more safeguards for the respective persons.
3 Ensuring higher standards of protection for applicants
The second part of the two-fold aim of the recast was to ensure higher standards of
protection for applicants. The following analysis of these standards is divided into
four parts.
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3.1 Protection of the right to family life
3.1.1 Best interests of the child
The primary consideration of the best interests of the child was—despite its founda-
tion in Article 3 of the Convention of the Rights of the Child and in Article 24 (2)
CFR—in practice not always secured as the Dublin II Regulation only contained an
explicit reference to this principle for the setting that an unaccompanied minor was
to be reunited with his/her family (Article 6 (1) of the Dublin II Regulation). This
had led to diverging practice with regard to the protection of minors by the Mem-
ber States mostly dependent on the strength of the national system for the protection
of children.34 The new set of rules in article 6 (“guarantees for minors”) addresses
this issue and provides for a full incorporation of the principle of the best interests
of the child into the Dublin system. Article 6 (1) does establish that this principle
is to be applied in all Dublin procedures regarding minors. Consequently, it is not
limited to unaccompanied minors and Member States have to ensure that the best
interests of minors are also considered if the Dublin procedure concerns accompa-
nied minors. Article 6 (3) provides for examples of factors that shall be considered
in this regard, most notably, the well-being and the social development of the minor
as well as safety and security questions and—as appropriate, depending on age and
maturity—the views of the minor. It will remain to be seen whether for the cases of
accompanied minors these guarantees will have a practical effect as there are no rules
for the implementation of the best interests principle for accompanied minors.
The protection of unaccompanied minors offered by Article 6 and Article 8 in
Dublin procedures is a significant improvement over the Dublin II Regulation. Just
before the entry into force of the recast regulation, the judgement of the CJEU in the
case MA and Others35 had practically put an end to transfers of unaccompanied mi-
nors within the Dublin system, if no family member or relative was present in the ter-
ritory of any Member State.36 The judgement in essence provides for a pre-disposed
test of the best interests of the child and comes to the conclusion that transfers should
not be carried out if no family member (or relative) is legally present in the territory
of the Member States. Informed by this reading the CJEU interprets Article 6 (2) of
the Dublin II Regulation as referring to the most recent application. The Court also
34In many Member States the crucial question was to what extent youth authorities have an influence in
Dublin procedures and/or whether the protection of the right of the child was actually done by immigration
specialists of youth protection entities.
35See above note 17.
36Some Nordic States still aim to transfer unaccompanied minors under a Dublin procedure if the respec-
tive minors already had received a negative decision in another Member State. This interpretation of the
judgment MA is based on a diverging reading of para. 63 and 64 of the judgment and places the principle
that there should only be one substantial decision over the principle that minors should not be transferred
at all (the latter is the reading of the Commission according to its proposal as well as of the majority of
Member States).
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states that Article 6 (2) is in this regard an exception from the principle of Article 5
(2).37
As the judgement came in after the negotiations on the recast had been finished
the Commission was invited to consider a revision of Article 8 (4) in the light of this
judgement.38 The Commission has lodged a proposal for the amendment of Article
8 (4) in June 2014.39 The content of the proposal has the potential to further enhance
the compatibility of the Dublin system with the framework for the protection of un-
accompanied children.40 Moreover, the new set of rules for minors and the reference
of article 6 to the necessity to assess the best interests of the child in every Dublin
procedure might also facilitate the development of a uniform definition of the best
interests of the child within the CEAS (and potentially beyond). The legal standards
provided for by article 24 (2) CFR will need to be developed and assessed in this
process.
3.1.2 Family unity at large
Another area of intended improvements was the protection of right to family life.
Already recital 14 contains a clearer commitment to its protection than the Dublin
II Regulation. It states that “the respect for family life should be a primary consid-
eration of Member States” when applying the Regulation. This reinforcement is also
mirrored the new definitions in Article 2 lit. g) and h). Moreover, the adaptation of
the Regulation to the concept of international protection has consequences for the
criteria that are related to family unity.
Nevertheless, the strengthening of the right to family life might in practice not have
the intended effects as the new provisions do not provide for a coherent approach to
this protection. For example, in total there are six constellations in which the family
unity is dependent of the definition of a family and related pre-conditions. Within
this framework five different standards are defined. In practice, this is bound to lead
to confusion and will most likely have negative effects on the application of family
related criteria.41
Another consequence of the recast is that the dependency clause (Article 16) has
been upgraded into a quasi criterion, which seems to be a step into the direction of
better protection of family members and relatives. Nevertheless, the actual new pro-
vision falls short of the scope of application that the CJEU had defined for Article 15
37Art. 5 (2) provides for the “petrification principle”. This means that for the purpose of establishing
responsibility the situation at the time of the first asylum application needs to be assessed. This principle
is retained in the recast Regulation in article 7 (2).
38Statement by the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission, published as part of the recast
Regulation, OJ L 180 of 29 June 2013, 59.
39Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) No
604/2013 as regards determining the Member State responsible for examining the application for interna-
tional protection of unaccompanied minors with no family member, sibling or relative legally present in a
Member State, COM (2014), 382 of 26 June 2014.
40See e.g. UN Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC) [4, 5].
41For a more in-depth analysis of these effects see Maiani/Hruschka, Der Schutz der Familieneinheit in
Dublin-Verfahren, ZAR 2014, 69.
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(2) of the Dublin II Regulation in its judgment K .42 This effect may only be coun-
tered by a rights-sensitive approach to article 17. Article 17 contains the discretionary
clauses and consists of a combination of the former sovereignty clause and the gen-
eral part of the former humanitarian clause. Looking at the drafting history especially
Article 17 (2) has been designed to allow for the respect of the right to family life
beyond the criteria of the Regulation. Such an approach is all the more warranted
as—as described—one aim of the recast was to strengthen the rights of applicants in
general and in particular the right to family life. This potential is to some extent al-
ready undermined by the case law of the CJEU as it has on several occasions at least
alluded to an interpretation of the sovereignty clause that makes the invocation of
its application by applicants at least difficult.43 The potential of Article 17 in family
related cases is nevertheless apparent and authorities should actually use it at least to
ensure that the strengthening of the right to family life becomes a reality in practice
under Dublin III.
3.2 Procedural rights in first instance procedures
With the introduction of Articles 4 and 5 the procedural rights of the applicants have
been significantly strengthened. Article 4 gives an explicit reference to the right to
information. This right was also stressed by the ECtHR in the context of potential
violations of Article 3 in conjunction with Article 13 in “asylum cases.” In particu-
lar this right has been an important argument in the rulings against Greece and Italy
in the cases M.S.S.44 and Hirsi.45 The information provided to applicants has been
regulated by Article 16a of the Dublin Implementing Regulation (as inserted by the
Regulation 118/2014) that provides for common information leaflets for applicants.
There are separate leaflets for applicants for international protection for unaccompa-
nied minors and for apprehended third-country nationals and stateless persons. These
leaflets are set out in Annexes X–XII of Regulation 118/2014. In practice, the leaflets
have created some significant technical problems regarding the necessary insertion of
the national law. This has led to the fact that currently (September 2014) the leaflets
of the Commission are not always used by Member States or have been significantly
adapted by MS prior to its use. Also the fact that the Commission has only provided
for translations into ten languages has created practical problems. Some Member
States have translated the leaflets in more languages at their own initiative. Member
States have also stated that they use the common leaflet for unaccompanied minors
also for applicants for international protection as it is generally better understood by
applicants.46
Article 5 provides for a personal interview of persons in a Dublin procedure and
aims at securing the right to be heard. As Article 5 does not explicitly state when
42See above note 15.
43See e.g. the decisions by the CJEU in N.S. and Others, MA and Others as well as in Puid (see above
notes 11 and 17).
44ECtHR, Application No. 30696/09, M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, 21 January 2013.
45ECtHR, Application No. 27765/09, Hirsi Jamaa an Others v. Italy, 23 February 2012.
46Information obtained from officials of Member States at a meeting in Malta in September 2014.
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and how such an interview should be held, the practice of Member States varies
quite significantly. Some provide for this interview at the beginning of the procedure
and do not specify the country that might be responsible for the asylum application,
whereas other Member States do give the applicant the possibility to explicitly speak
to the intended decision. An interview would therefore be most logically need to be
conducted after the decision was made to lodge a take back or take charge request
to another Member State. Looking at the reasoning of the CJEU in the judgement
M.M.47 it seems to be clear that an applicant needs to be—at least in practice—in the
position to bring forward arguments against the actual transfer decision.
3.3 Effective legal remedy
The recast Regulation newly contains rules for appeals that have been previously re-
ferred to the national context. The main reasons for this approach seem to be twofold.
The first reason is the development of better legal standards. Since the entry into force
of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union its Article 47 is manda-
torily providing for an effective legal remedy and also the case law of the ECtHR has
significantly developed since the adoption of the Dublin II Regulation.48 The sec-
ond reason seems to be the diverging practice of Member States regarding appeals
against Dublin decisions. The new rules consist of two principal safeguards. Article
26 provides for a mandatory notification of the Dublin decision including the neces-
sary information on legal remedies and the possibility to apply for suspensive effect.
Article 27 provides for three different models of possible appeals procedures. The
choice of providing models in a binding Regulation seems to be inconsistent with the
aim to establish common standards, but on a practical level these models represent
the different legal traditions regarding appeals in the Member States. They are all ori-
ented on the fundamental principle of an effective remedy in law and practice. Recital
19 explains that Member States are required to assess the law and practice in the re-
quested state at least at the level of appeal.49 These guarantees are complemented by
Article 27 (5) and (6) providing for legal assistance and interpretation for applicants
in the case of appeals. The access to legal assistance free of charge may be restricted
by the Member States to cases with “tangible prospects of success” and is limited to
the treatment accorded to nationals of the respective state.
The provisions guarantee an effective remedy in law. The question whether the
new rules for appeals provide for an effective remedy in practice will very much
depend on the interpretation of the CJEU’s judgements in the above mentioned cases
47CJEU, Case C-277/11, M.M., 22 November 2012, ECLI:EU:C:2012:744.
48See in particular the judgements of the ECtHR, Application No. 25389/05, Gebremedhin v. France, 26
April 2007 and M.S.S. (above note 44).
49Recital 19 of the recast Regulation contains an explanation of this principle: “In order to guarantee
effective protection of the rights of the persons concerned, legal safeguards and the right to an effective
remedy in respect of decisions regarding transfers to the Member State responsible should be established,
in accordance, in particular, with Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
In order to ensure that international law is respected, an effective remedy against such decisions should
cover both the examination of the application of this Regulation and of the legal and factual situation
in the Member State to which the applicant is transferred.” (emphasis added).
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Abdullahi and Puid in the practice of the Member States. Both cases concern the
practical effectiveness of an appeal against Dublin decisions.
In Abdullahi the court states that an appeal under the Dublin II Regulation in the
context of illegal entry (article 10 of the Dublin II Regulation) is limited to cases of
systemic deficiencies. Even though this judgment was clearly limited to the Dublin II
Regulation and did not reference the guarantees contained in Article 47 CFR Mem-
ber States and even courts have interpreted this provision as severely restricting the
possibility to even lodge appeals against Dublin decisions.50 Other member States
and courts have taken a different view.51 Also the practice of the ECtHR seems to
incorporate the notion of systemic deficiencies.52
In Puid the CJEU has reconfirmed its view that the use of the sovereignty clause
should be limited to exceptional cases. Nevertheless, most Member States are actually
using the sovereignty clause in cases where a transfer is not possible. For the right to
appeal it will be decisive whether the courts of the Member States (and/or the CJEU)
will take the view that also applicants may base an appeal on the misuse of discretion
when assessing the potential application of Article 17.53
3.4 Coercive measures
The new rules for detention for the purpose of transfer contained in Article 28 have
been subject to fierce debates during the recast procedure. The solution that has now
emerged as a result of the legislative procedure contains a significant improvement
for applicants in number of Member States whereas for other Member States these
standards mean a possibility for easier detention for the purpose of Dublin transfers.
The standards establish minimum guarantees for applicants and are informed by the
standards as contained in international54 and in EU law.55 Article 28 starts with a
reminder of the principle that “Member States shall not hold a person in detention
for the sole reason that he or she is subject to the procedure established by this Reg-
ulation.” It further contains safeguards and rules for detaining persons subject to a
Dublin transfer in Article 28 (2) and (3) that are oriented towards the principle of
proportionality and provide for an individual assessment and the prior assessment of
less coercive measures. Dublin detention is limited to cases where there is a serious
50Most notably (so far) the German Federal Administrative Court has taken this view: FAC, 10 B 6/14, 19
March 2014.
51In the case called EM (Eritrea), [2014] UKSC 12, 19 February 2014, the UK Supreme Court has stated
that the real risk test developed by the ECtHR since the case Soering v. UK (Application No. 14038/88, 7
July 1989) remains the valid test.
52See e.g. ECtHR, Application No. 71932/12, Mohammadi v. Austria, 3 July 2014, § 74. However, the
leading case of Tarakhel v. Switzerland (Application No. 29217/12) is still pending at the time of writing.
53See already above under 3.2.2 in the context of the protection of family life.
54See UNHCR, Guidelines on the Applicable Criteria and Standards relating to the Detention of Asylum-
Seekers and Alternatives to Detention, 2012.
55Most notably in the area of forcible returns as established in particular in Chapter II (“termination of
illegal stay”) of the Returns Directive (Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Coun-
cil of 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally
staying third-country nationals).
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risk of absconding and is limited to six weeks (and a total maximum period of de-
tention of three months). If the respective time limits are not complied with (also the
shortened time limit for the lodging of a take back or take charge request) the per-
son “shall no longer be detained.” Article 28 (3) 1 explicitly refers to a due diligence
standard in this regard.
According to Article 28 (4) the guarantees of Articles 9, 10 and 11 of the recast
Reception Conditions Directive (RCD)56 apply. From a legal point of view these
guarantees are for Dublin procedures part of the Regulation and thus immediately
binding on all Member States applying the recast Regulation. As the guarantees are
part of the Regulation this also applies to “opt-out”-States and associated States.57
It is established that the legal effect of references to Directives in Regulations (if the
referenced parts are specific enough to be directly applied) means that they have direct
effect as part of the Regulation itself.58 In practical terms, this means that Article 28
(4) needs to be read as if it would contain the full wording of Articles 9–11 of the
recast RCD.
4 Way forward
The analysis provided in this article has brought to light that the new rules of the
Dublin III Regulation have the potential to enhance effectiveness as well as to ensure
higher standards of protection if the respective standards and guarantees are applied
in a practical and human rights-sensitive way. The impact of the practical application
of the recast Regulation is therefore very much dependent on the national authorities
and courts. The tasks for decision makers include the (legal and practical) analysis
of the new provisions and their application. It is also necessary to clearly define the
challenges and particularly for courts to identify potential precedent setting cases
with a view to seeking clarification of ambiguous provisions and/or conflicting norms
from the European Institutions (in particular from the CJEU).
Challenges regarding the protection of fundamental rights include the identifica-
tion and addressing of “grey areas” (i.e. issues left open by the recast Regulation
and/or the case law). Most notably issues to be addressed in this context are the no-
tion of the best interests of the child and the protection of the right to family life. More
generally, the scope and impact of the newly introduced individual rights, including
the procedural rights for applicants, needs to be defined. The most interesting and
most disputed area in the past was the right to an effective remedy against a Dublin
56Directive 2013/33/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 laying down
standards for the reception of applicants for international protection (recast).
57Ireland, the United Kingdom and Denmark have “opted out” of parts of the CEAS, whereas the “Dublin
States” Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland are not Members of the EU but associated to the
Dublin system.
58In a case concerning the Common Agricultural Policy the German Federal Administrative Court (FAC)
stated that the referenced Directives had direct effect within the scope of application of the Regulation
(“Die in Bezug genommenen Richtlinien erlangten im Regelungsbereich der Verordnung unmittelbare Gel-
tung.” FAC, 3 C 25.12, 19 September 2013, para 8).
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decision. This is likely to continue to be challenging in the future, as the quite restric-
tive recent case law of the CJEU seems (at least to some extent) to be at variance with
the better access to legal remedies for applicants offered by the recast Regulation. As
this area has significantly developed over the last years, it is foreseeable that this will
remain the core debate in the area of Dublin procedures. The essential question in
this regard on the national level is whether there is an obligation to apply Article 17
under specific circumstances and whether an appeal against Dublin decisions beyond
the notions of “systemic flaws” is still possible. Only if the answer to both questions
is in the affirmative (at least on the national level) a substantial judicial protection of
applicants subject to Dublin procedures seems to be possible.
On a practical basis, it can be estimated that the number of appeals will most likely
significantly drop, if the aim of a real CEAS is coming closer to reality. As long as
diverging standards of protection and reception conditions prevail within the Dublin
area and as long as the freedom of movement of beneficiaries of international protec-
tion remains restricted, “secondary” movements will remain part of the reality of the
CEAS. If the Dublin system shall remain a corner stone of the CEAS, these issues
need to be addressed in order to enhance the damaged credibility of the system.59
For the future of the CEAS questions of joint processing, a uniform protection sta-
tus, as well as the rights of beneficiaries of international protection within the CEAS
will be decisive for the credibility and effectiveness of the system as a whole and for
the responsibility allocation in particular. In this regard, the (unclear) legal situation
of the opt-out States and the associated States may become a stumbling block. On the
institutional level, it will be a task specifically for coordination mechanisms like the
Dublin Contact Committee meetings and for EASO to help to identify and implement
practical solutions for the described challenges.
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